My speech on occasion of the Covid-19 (Temporary Measures) Amendment Bill dealing with confidentiality of digital contact tracing data
Mr Murali Pillai (Bukit Batok): Mr Speaker, Sir, today’s debate is about accountability to Parliament. As leaders, it is important to communicate clearly as well as in a principled manner. If we had stated in this House that TraceTogether data is to be used only for contact tracing, then it should be so. Even if there is great benefit to be gained by using it for other purposes, even if there is fine print that allows us to do so, we should forebear. If we want to take a different approach from what was earlier represented in this House, then we should raise the matter here for debate and convince hon Members in this House that it is necessary to change tack.
This is responsible politics. It is for this reason that I welcome the introduction of this Bill.
The hon Leader of Opposition in his speech mentioned that there are quarters outside this House which ascribe a sinister motive in relation to the point as to whether the hon Minister knew from the outset that the data was to be used for other matters, apart from contact tracing, in particular, in dealing with investigation of offences.
What is noteworthy, as the hon Leader of Opposition mentioned, was that in the hon Prime Minister’s speech on the 21 April 2020, he had already stated that in relation to the digital contact tracing efforts, there could be privacy concerns.
I filed a Parliamentary Question for the sitting in June 2020. On 4 June 2020, the Government’s answer was that the data from TraceTogether would be used for contact tracing only. So, just looking at two points, April and June, you could already see there is a bit of a disjunct and there was an error that arose arising from the fact that while on one hand, the Prime Minister said there could be some privacy concerns, on the other, the Minister had pointed out that the data would only be used for contact tracing.
I, like the hon Member Mr Christopher de Souza, looked at the chronology of the entire saga and I am convinced that this error, just like the hon Leader of Opposition said, is not an error that was intentionally made. It was an error, in the words of Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, a mea culpa that arose because it was not drawn to his attention that the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) was applicable.
This Bill asks for permission to make TraceTogether and SafeEntry data, which was meant to be used for contact tracing to be available to the Police when there is a clear and pressing need to use that data for criminal investigations into seven categories of serious offences. In this regard, both the hon Leader of Opposition, Mr Pritam Singh, and the hon Member Ms Sylvia Lim, asked questions in relation to exactly when this would arise in practice. One point that was made was that the Police has already an abundance of tools.
But, to me, I find it useful that in this Bill, there is the operative words “clear and pressing need”, and that, to me, limits the ability to use the data. And in relation to the seven categories — these are serious crimes that we are talking about — anyone looking at it would know that — and I am, in a sense, sharing what I am going to say a bit later — in balancing privacy concerns with really the concern for meting out justice in relation to the commission of serious offences, the Police should be provided access.
The question is a simple one. If these harms fall on your parent, your sibling, your child, and if the data from your TraceTogether token can make a difference between solving the case and leaving it unsolved, or if it means catching the criminal in days rather than in months or even years, would we not say yes?
I do say yes, and this is why I support this Bill. I do so for one main reason — it is in line with the current legislative policy to allow the Police access to any relevant data, no matter how personal, in their investigations.
As it stands, there is no blanket privacy protection that applies across the board. Our private phone logs, our banking records, are all subject to these provisions. The need for privacy must be weighed against the demands of justice, and the need to protect the safety and security of all Singaporeans. We are by no means unique in taking this stance. I made mention last month in this House that there is parity between the positions taken in Singapore and the European Union through its General Data Protection Regulations.
An easy way out of this decision, it would be to say that TraceTogether and SafeEntry, taken together, is an aberration — if it had not existed, what would the Police do? The Police have solved crimes before TraceTogether and SafeEntry, and will do so after the programme has been stood down. So, why do we feel it needs this? Why not do without?
It would indeed be the easier route — just keep to the original promise, forget about the data and pretend we never had it.
But the fact remains that this is not a hypothetical armchair philosophy question. We have real crimes, real lives at stake. It is morally indefensible to shut our eyes to the answer when knowing it would make a difference in cracking a serious crime case and bringing the culprit to face justice and, possibly, save other lives from being victims of serious crime. This is not a crude utilitarian trampling of principles for a greater good. It is, in fact, the principle from which all Police powers come — the demand for justice, the right to be protected from evil and harm.
To those people who are troubled because they received this raft of conspiracy messages, saying that, “Oh, the Police has no system to protect data and they use it for all kinds of issues”; let me just say it for myself as a criminal lawyer for the past 25 years and a former police officer before that, that I know personally how seriously the Police deals with issues of misuse of data. I know of cases, some of them were cases where I represented the ex-officers, where there was misuse of data, and the Police officers concerned were prosecuted.
So, there is a system and I would want to share my own experience with those who are troubled by these conspiracy messages.
A more difficult question — and that was posed by the hon Member Mr Christopher de Souza — is why then limit this access to serious crimes as defined under the Bill, given the state of law at this point? He spoke about the need to extend it to cover other classes of drug offences. With respect, this question ignores the facts and circumstances that have led us to this point. As hon Members are already familiar with the background, I will desist from recounting it again in my speech.
The crucial point to note is that this Bill represents a compromise to ensure that we do not take the risk of losing the ability to conduct contact tracing quickly and aggressively via TraceTogether and SafeEntry when we are in the midst of a pandemic.
It seems to me that there is broad agreement for data to be used to investigate the seven categories of serious crime proposed under the Bill. I do appreciate the hon Member Ms Sylvia Lim’s point about the fact that they are not defined in terms of cross-reference to provisions but there is already description of the serious crimes. To me, that is sufficient. Using the general principles of interpretation, one would get to know what is (the) parliamentary intention.
Extending the categories will require hon Members of this House to take a gamble on whether or not a group of Singaporeans and residents will still be prepared to adopt TraceTogether and SafeEntry — and that is a point that the hon Leader of Opposition made — or, instead, be put off in light of the extended use of the data. This is not a gamble that we should take, given the state of COVID-19 pandemic today. It is far worse than a year ago — the mutating virus has variants which are more infectious and lethal, more than 2 million dead across the world, a reporter in tears on “live” TV as she visited hospitals where patients are dying from lack of proper healthcare, students in a university ringfenced by metal fences to regulate visitor movements and keep them safe. This quick escalation can happen in Singapore if we were to lose our cohesion resulting in our healthcare resources being overwhelmed.
Even the vaccine is not a magic bullet. There are no magic bullets. All we have is our very human responses — our responsibility to each other, our own recognition of our vulnerabilities, our hopes and our better selves.
TraceTogether and SafeEntry, collectively, is a tool to help us in this pandemic and we need it in this new and present threat. It is also a tool to help us against the old evils of human depravity, greed and lust. There is no reason why it cannot do both. Even if one contact were traced through which one serious crime is solved or one serious crime is prevented, it would be worthwhile. And we just need one reason to support this Bill.
In closing, I would like to refer to the hon Leader of Opposition’s point about the future and how we should regulate data in the future.
I would suggest, especially, in the context of the present crisis and the efforts being expended to contain the threat of COVID-19, we should also be looking at the future when we have to contain another crisis.
In that kind of scenario, what would we want to be as Members in this House? Should we just be ambassadors of our people, just conveying what this group of people have expressed, or that group of people have expressed? Would that be sufficient? Or would it be necessary that we bear the responsibility as leaders to move our people, to say, “This is a crisis. Yes, errors will be made. But look at the conduct. Look at the outcome.”
We must have the courage to move our people in one direction to overcome the crisis together. And that to me would be a big lesson for the future. I support this Bill.
