Highlighting the Consensus Between Both Sides of the House on FICA and Keeping the Minister Politically Accountable for Sensitive National Security Issues.

Mr. Speaker, in my first speech in this session of Parliament, I said that I saw building consensus as an important outcome of our work here. The outcome of such a process where areas of agreement are identified would possess the unique legitimacy of all voices in this House.

The hon Leader of the Opposition started his speech by observing that there are quarters outside this House whose views on this Bill are diametrically different from the Government. That may or may not be so. But what is more important is to make it clear, as elected representatives of our people, where we stand, either together or apart on matters under deliberation — not just the broad strokes but the detailed issues as well. That is accountability.

I had carefully reviewed the proposed amendments of the Workers’ Party. We only have a few matters upon which we disagree.

Both sides of the House are aligned with the aim of the Bill. The hon Leader of the Opposition agreed that intrusive powers may have to be vested with the Minister to deal with this scourge of foreign interference subject, of course, to checks and balances, which I will come to later. I thank the hon Leader of the Opposition for recognising this.

Both also agree on what constitutes public interest under clause 7 of the Bill.

Clause 7 represents the heart of FICA. It enumerates the areas of public interest, including to prevent any foreign interference directed towards a political end in Singapore.

The hon Member Mr. Gerald Giam wants to be more specific about what is meant by the meaning of this clause. In my mind, we should equally be mindful of the agreed position of what is not the intention of the clause. It is not to curtail political activity by Singaporean civil society or politicians.

There is also consensus on what constitutes Politically Significant Persons (PSPs) and the responsibilities they should assume. Such persons, because they carry political weight, there is a need to ensure they do not become pawns for foreign influence.

Clause 14 deals with defined PSPs. It is noteworthy that the hon Member Mr. Gerald Giam wishes to enlarge this list in the clause further to include more classes of people.

The Bill, as it stands, requires the Government to make a case if there is any other person outside the list it feels should be designated as PSPs. The hon Mr. Member Gerald Giam’s rendering puts even more people on this list. That is to say, this Bill has a net which the hon Member Mr. Gerald Giam wants to make larger.

On the issue of criminalising conduct amounting to foreign interference and influence operations under clauses 17 and 18, there is broad consensus. There should be little controversy over this. We are, after all, talking about actions of spies and saboteurs.

The hon Member Assoc Prof Jamus Lim wishes to limit the ambit of the clauses to only criminal acts that the accused knew would be prejudicial to the security of Singapore as opposed to acts that are likely to be prejudicial to the security of Singapore.

The focus here is on the impact of the accused’s action. But before that, he has to be proven to be acting on behalf of a foreign principal. So, that is a narrow issue.

I turn now to the proposed authorisation of the Minister to issue Part 3 directions under clauses 20 and 21.

There is, again, broad consensus to allow the Minister to issue directions, including anticipatory directions where in his opinion there is online communication activity being undertaken by or on behalf of a foreign principal in or accessible in Singapore to protect public interest.

Here, the hon Member wishes to limit the Minister’s powers to circumstances where he secures a higher threshold of evidence of foreign interference instead of reasonable belief or suspicion.

Given the protean nature of foreign interference, this has to be resolved on the basis on which wording protects Singapore’s interest.

Currently, the Police powers of investigations are triggered as long as there is reasonable suspicion of a commission of a crime. The question arises as to why should there be a higher bar to trigger appropriate action when it comes to foreign interference affecting Singapore’s security interests?

This House is unified on the point of vesting in the Minister the power to issue the 14 types of directions to various entities — known as Part 3 directions — in particular, to social media companies described in clause 29 to protect public interest.

I now come to powers of proscription. There is consensus to vest in the Minister the power under clause 24 to Proscribe Online Locations which would be subject to Part 3 directions.

There is agreement to criminalise behaviour that involves the making of money or providing financial support to Proscribed Online Locations.

The only difference here, again, based on the proposed amendment by the same hon Member is on the ambit of evidence required to make out the offence.

Again, this issue is a narrow issue that has been dealt with on the basis of which wording would better protect Singapore’s interest.

On the measures of designating an entity or person as a PSP under clauses 80 and 81, there is full agreement on the ability of a competent authority to designate an entity or person as politically significant entities or Politically Significant Persons.

The additional point here, as proposed by the hon Member Mr. Leon Perera is that the public list of politically significant entities and persons be maintained unless there is a national security ground, not to name these persons or entities.

I agree with the suggestion. I understand that MHA had earlier indicated that it had intended to do this based on its response dated 25 September 2021 to queries from The Straits Times.

There is consensus in this House on the provisions dealing with political donations. There is full consensus to impose on politically significant persons during election period, a requirement that they declare that they are not subject to foreign influence. There is broad consensus to require these persons to make disclosures of any dealing with/or on behalf of foreign principals or foreign political organisations under clauses 78 and 79, even if the Acts are not directed towards a political end in Singapore, as well as benefits received from these principals.

What is proposed here again by the hon Member Mr. Perera is for such disclosures to be made publicly available. From a practical perspective, it seems to me the sting behind this provision will be to deal with the consequence on the part of the PSP for failing to file the report. I say this because if a PSP files a report stating that he has dealings with a foreign principal, directed to a political end in Singapore, it is likely to spell the death knell of his political career. In other words, the publicness of the report maybe neither here nor there.

Turning to the arena of requiring disclosure of foreign involvement in publication of political matters, I know again there is consensus in vesting with the competent authority the power to issue transparency directives to newspapers, broadcasting services and PSPs requiring a disclosure of foreign principals and links. The hon Member, Mr. Perera suggested that such directives be made public. I agree but I think the suggestion is already present in the current version of the Bill which specifically provides that the subjects of the directives must make disclosure conspicuously.

There is consensus in the ability on the part of the competent authority to issue directives to PSPs to end their afflictions with foreign principals and foreign volunteers. The additional suggestion made by the hon Member Mr. Perera that is being made here is that to have these directives together with any other modification of cancellation made public. In this regard, I understand MHA had issued a statement on making public such countermeasures issued against PSPs.

There is broad agreement on what constitutes exempt activities, that is activities that should not be covered under this Act. The hon Member Assoc Prof Lim proposed adding in this list an exemption on the part of Singaporeans exercising their right to discuss politics and foreign individuals and publications commenting on Singapore politics in an open, transparent and attributable way. I do not disagree that such acts should be outside the jurisdiction of this Bill. The only issue is whether it is necessary, given that the structure of this Bill already makes it clear that it is not intended to stifle such activities.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I accept the hon friends across aisle feel strongly about the differences with the Government which are set out in the Notice of Amendments. My objective here is simply to point out to the fact that there is much more agreement on significant matters than disagreement. This may not be apparent to members of public outside this House.

In my view, the most substantive area of difference lies with the redress mechanism under the Bill which I now turn to.

Under the Bill, it is proposed that appeals made to the Reviewing Tribunal and the Minister with limited judicial review by the Supreme Court. The hon Member Ms. He Ting Ru, proposed that appeals be heard hurt by the High Court, with the right of further appeal. I appreciate that her motivation is to provide checks and balances. I would respectfully demur with her suggestion although I must acknowledge there are merits to the broad rationale behind her proposal. As for my reasons for demurring, I need only refer to my Adjournment Motion speech made recently this House when I spoke about judicial review in March 2021.

Both the hon Leader of Opposition and the hon Member Ms. He, kindly referred to some parts of my speech today. I said then that each generation of political leaders and people must find their own equilibrium on what is acceptable. They will also recall that in my same speech, I went on to state that, in my view, the status quo should be preserved for the ISA. I recounted the point made in 1991 by Prof S Jayakumar, the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs in this House that when it comes to issues of national security, putting a Court to scrutinise exercise of powers would be tantamount to giving the Court, an unelected body, the final say on such matters. That, in the scheme of things, was not desirable.

To me, FICA raises the same issues. It is preferable, when it comes to assessment of what action is to be taken, to counter foreign interference affecting public interest, the Minister must be held responsible and accountable through the political process. Also, in my respectful view, since we are dealing with issues of foreign interference affecting public interest, as defined under this Bill, a different form of procedure to ensure the swift and agile handling of cases and judicious safeguarding of sensitive information will be needed.

…

The hon Member Ms. He referred to the point I made in my speech in March this year on the need for the sunlight of scrutiny of Government action. I thank her for remembering my speech. She may also remember that I stated then in my speech that ISA did not act and does not act in darkness, having regard where checks and balances embedded in the Act and the Constitution. Similarly, having regard to the subject matter of FICA, establishment of the appellate process in the Bill to set up the Review Tribunal and the preservation of the Supreme Court’s powers of judicial review on the issue of procedure as well as when there is an excess of jurisdiction and political accountability of the Minister to our people, I am similarly of the view that there are sufficient checks and balances in place for FICA. The Bill does not confer unlimited power to the Executive, which is a concern of the hon Leader of Opposition.

I think it is worthwhile holding up again this handout, page 36, which the hon Minister Mr. Shanmugam showed us earlier. There are already general powers. You can see that in the light green. What FICA aims to do is to give targeted powers, and you see that in dark green. I heard the hon Member Mr. Perera saying just now a theory about FICA having some latent powers being embedded which can be used later on by a Government which is malevolently intending to use these powers. If that is really the case, it will be better to use the latent powers already embedded in the current Acts. You do not have to pass FICA for that. So, with respect, I have difficulty following his argument.

Notwithstanding what I said, I have a few questions on the redress mechanism concerning the Reviewing Tribunal under clause 92 of the Bill. The Reviewing Tribunal deals with appeals against an authorisation of a Part III direction. I note it is contemplated that the chairperson of the Reviewing Tribunal must be a Supreme Court Judge. I also note that the decision is to be made by the President on the advice of the Cabinet. To me, the President should be consulting the Chief Justice, who heads our Judiciary in deciding who should be the chairman. This is the case under Article 151(2) of the Constitution which provides the chairman and two members of the Advisory Board which deals with preventive detention under the ISA shall be appointed by the President after consulting the Chief Justice. I seek the hon Minister’s explanation on this matter.

Next, may I ask if the Reviewing Tribunal will be a standing tribunal that is appointed at the outset for a period of time or will it be an ad hoc tribunal that is created as and when there is an appeal? My preference is that it should be a standing tribunal to ensure transparency.

Moving on to the powers of the Reviewing Tribunal, is it contemplated that the Tribunal will have powers to compel the appearance of witnesses and production of documents? This does not appear to be specifically referred to in the clauses that I have reviewed.

I now turn to appeals to the Minister against decision of competent authority’s decision, designating a person as a PSP or given a directive to comply with on that basis. May I please ask what is the rationale of designating the Minister as the primary Appellate body as opposed to designating the Reviewing Tribunal as the Appellate body?

To clause 102, I note that the Minister may appoint an Advisory Committee for consultation purposes but he may not follow the advice. May I ask if the appointments will be gazetted and made public, without going to merits of the case, which is obviously sensitive? How would the public know that the Minister is not following the Advisory Committee’s advice in making the determination on an appeal?

Mr. Speaker, Sir, in my speech, I have noted that the hon Opposition Members have raised some points of disagreement. I have argued, however, there is a lot more agreement on the main issues. I have seen more that unites than divides us. I acknowledge there is one major sticking point on whether the review should be a political or legal matter. I argued that, like other matters of national security, it ought to be a political matter and hence should rest with the Minister.

An important point of agreement, however, is where and how we disagree in such matters, such as public interest. The PAP and the Workers’ Party may disagree on what this interest is, both in substance and form and in the matters, both trivial and significant. But we both agree that such discussions must remain our own. These discussions must enjoy the most important freedom of all, that they be free of interference from foreign principals who ought to have no voice in this House.